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The effectiveness of alcohol brief intervention (ABI) has been established by a succession
of meta-analyses but, because the effects of ABI are small, null findings from randomized
controlled trials are often reported and can sometimes lead to skepticism regarding the
benefits of ABI in routine practice. This article first explains why null findings are likely to
occur under null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) due to the phenomenon known
as “the dance of the p-values.” A number of misconceptions about null findings are then
described, using as an example the way in which the results of the primary care arm of
a recent cluster-randomized trial of ABI in England (the SIPS project) have been misunder-
stood. These misinterpretations include the fallacy of “proving the null hypothesis” that
lack of a significant difference between the means of sample groups can be taken as evi-
dence of no difference between their population means, and the possible effects of this
and related misunderstandings of the SIPS findings are examined.The mistaken inference
that reductions in alcohol consumption seen in control groups from baseline to follow-up
are evidence of real effects of control group procedures is then discussed and other pos-
sible reasons for such reductions, including regression to the mean, research participation
effects, historical trends, and assessment reactivity, are described. From the standpoint
of scientific progress, the chief problem about null findings under the conventional NHST
approach is that it is not possible to distinguish “evidence of absence” from “absence of
evidence.” By contrast, under a Bayesian approach, such a distinction is possible and it is
explained how this approach could classify ABIs in particular settings or among particular
populations as either truly ineffective or as of unknown effectiveness, thus accelerating
progress in the field of ABI research.
Keywords: alcohol-related problems, brief interventions, randomized controlled trials, null findings, null hypothesis
significance testing, Bayesian statistics
The effectiveness of alcohol brief intervention (ABI) in reduc-
ing alcohol consumption among hazardous and harmful drinkers
is generally considered to have been demonstrated by a succes-
sion of systematic reviews with meta-analysis (1). The focus of
these reviews in terms of types of ABI and settings for imple-
mentation has varied, together with the precise form in which
effectiveness has been demonstrated (e.g., with regard to the inten-
sity of effective intervention) (2, 3). The conclusions of secondary
analyses concerning, for example, gender differences in response
to ABI (2, 4) have also differed. There is little good evidence as
yet for the effects of ABI on outcomes beyond consumption, e.g.,
morbidity or mortality (5). While apparently strong in the pri-
mary health care (PHC) setting, the evidence to support ABI in
emergency (6) and general hospital (7) settings is more equiv-
ocal. But despite these reservations, all meta-analytic reviews of
ABI in general and ABI in PHC in particular have found, with-
out exception, that participants who receive ABI show greater
reductions in alcohol consumption at follow-up than those who
do not.
This positive verdict on the effectiveness of ABI notwithstand-
ing, null findings from randomized or otherwise controlled trials,
in which the statistical superiority of ABI over control conditions
has not been demonstrated, frequently occur; they are often
encountered in the literature and routinely reported at scientific
conferences. Given the overall benefits of ABI shown in meta-
analyses, reasons for these frequent failures to confirm effectiveness
are not obvious but it may be that the effects of ABI are sufficiently
small that they are difficult to detect (see below), in addition to
other possible reasons. Whatever the reasons, they can have a
dispiriting effect on researchers, health care administrators, and
policy-makers. Researchers may be discouraged from pursuing
research in the field of ABI and may not bother to submit their null
findings for publication (8). Even if papers reporting null findings
are submitted, and despite frequent admonitions that null find-
ings based on competently designed research should be published
(9), they may be rejected by journal editors, thus possibly biasing
the results of meta-analyses. Health administrators may be per-
suaded to devote more resources to other areas of health care and
policy-makers may listen more sympathetically to the arguments
of those who are opposed to the widespread implementation of
ABI as a means of reducing alcohol-related harm in the popula-
tion (10). The damaging effects of null findings may be especially
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pronounced when they originate from large, expensively funded,
and well-publicized trials.
Another kind of problem associated with null findings is that
they may be misinterpreted, leading sometimes to inappropriate
calls for the implementation of interventions that lack support-
ing evidence. A prominent source of such misinterpretation arises
because of the classic error of “proving the null hypothesis.” Con-
fusion is also likely to arise because of the frequent finding in trials
of ABI of reductions in drinking, sometime quite large, in control
conditions. Lastly, a limitation of the interpretation of null find-
ings under the conventional null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) approach to ABI research is that it is unable to distin-
guish between two potentially different conclusions: that there is
no evidence that the intervention under study is effective and that
there is evidence that it is ineffective. As we shall see, this limitation
has a retarding effect on scientific progress in this area of research.
Against this background, the issue of null findings from trials
of ABI will be discussed with the following aims:
i. To show that, even though effects of ABI in the population may
be real, it is not surprising that these effects often fail to be
detected in research trials.
ii. To describe ways in which null findings are often misunder-
stood, with potentially damaging consequences for practice and
policy on ABI.
iii. To explore one of the key characteristics of null findings in the
field of ABI research – the tendency for control groups to show
relatively large reductions in alcohol consumption.
iv. To suggest a way in which one of main drawbacks arising from
null findings – the inability to distinguish between “absence of
evidence” and “evidence of absence” – can be overcome.
THE DANCE OF THE p-VALUES
Over the past few years a YouTube video presentation by Emeri-
tus Professor Geoff Cumming of La Trobe University, Melbourne,
VIC, Australia, entitled “The dance of the p-values,”1 has been
circulating universities around the world [see also Ref. (11), p.
135–42]. Cumming amusingly and persuasively illustrates the
enormous variability in the p-value simply due to sampling vari-
ability. He claims that most researchers fail to appreciate how
unreliable the p-value is as a measure of the strength of evidence
to support a finding.
In his demonstration, Cumming considers an experiment con-
sisting of two independent groups, Experimental (E) and Control
(C), designed to investigate the effect of an intervention on a vari-
able measuring some relevant participant behavior. He assumes a
population effect of the intervention, unknown of course to the
experimenter, equivalent to an effect size of half a standard devi-
ation or Cohen’s δ= 0.5, conventionally regarded as a medium
effect (12). This results in two normally distributed populations
with standard deviations of the same size. In the experiment, both
E and C groups have size N = 32, giving a power to detect a
medium-sized effect of 0.52 for a two-tailed test with α= 0.05.
1http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ez4DgdurRPg&feature=youtu.be
Using his Explanatory Software for Confidence Intervals (ESCI)2,
Cumming runs a simulation of 1,500 experiments by sampling
from the assumed populations and observes the resulting distri-
bution of p-values for the obtained differences between E and C
group means. These range from p= 0.8 to p < 0.001, even though
there has been no change in the population effect. When grouped
in a frequency histogram (Figure 1), the most frequent category
of p-values at 36.1% is those exceeding p= 0.10 and clearly non-
significant. A further 12.3% are in the questionable, “approaching
significance” range of between p <0.10 and >0.05. Altogether,
48.4% of p-values are >0.05, meaning that by orthodox statisti-
cal practice on nearly half the occasions this experiment might be
conducted a null finding would eventuate, even though there is an
effect of intervention in the population. The other 51.6% of results
would be taken as statistically significant but these are distributed
over the conventional labels of “significant”(p < 0.05),“highly sig-
nificant”(p < 0.01), and“very highly significant”(p < 0.001), even
though, again, nothing has changed in the size of the effect in the
population. Cumming likens running a single experiment under
these circumstances to visiting “the p-value casino” because the
obtained p-value will be randomly chosen from the infinite series
of possible values; obtaining a statistically significant p-value is like
winning at roulette. The calculation of effect sizes with confidence
intervals gives much more reliable information on what is likely
to happen on replication (13).
It might be objected here that randomized controlled trials of
ABI are usually more powerful than the experiment in the pre-
ceding paragraph. This may be true, although sample sizes not
much different from N = 32 per group are not unknown in the
scientific literature on ABI. Against that, the effect size for ABI is
likely to be smaller than δ= 0.5 and is better estimated as small to
medium (14), say δ= 0.35. The distribution of possible p-values
2http://www.latrobe.edu.au/psy/research/cognitive-and-developmental-psychology/
esci
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FIGURE 1 | Frequency histogram of p-values (%) for 1,500 simulated
experiments (see text). Adapted from Cumming ((11), p. 139).
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from any given experiment depends solely on statistical power.
If the conventional recommendation for adequate power of 80%
is accepted, in a two-group comparison similar to that described
above, the sample size necessary to detect a small to medium effect
by a two-tailed t -test at the 5% significance level and assuming
equally sized groups is 130 per group [G*Power 3.0.10, (15)]. A
minority of trials of ABI are this big and the remainder will be sub-
ject to varying degrees to the casino scenario described above. Even
with a power of 80% to detect a real but small to medium effect,
one-fifth of possible p-values will fail to reach the 0.05 significance
level and will be erroneously regarded as null findings, i.e., they
will be Type II errors. If the assumption of the effect of ABI is made
more conservatively at δ= 0.2, conventionally regarded as a small
effect and arguably a minimally interesting effect of ABI, a sample
size of 394 per group is needed to give a 80% chance of detecting
an effect and very few trials of ABI are this large.
The solution to this problem of widely varying p-values carry-
ing little information is, according to Cumming (11) and to many
others, to abandon NHST in favor of estimating effect sizes with
confidence intervals. He points out that this estimation approach
to research findings is standard in the “hard” sciences like physics
and chemistry, is commonly employed in most areas of medical
research, and has been recommended in the Publications Man-
ual of the American Psychological Association (16). At the same
time, NHST has been severely criticized now for over 50 years
(17) but still continues to be popular and standard practice in
many disciplines within the human sciences. Without attempting
to resolve this issue here, what can be said is that the abandonment
of NHST – and particularly the abandonment of the dichotomy
between observed differences that are“real”and those that are“just
due to chance”(18) – would be a radical solution to the problem we
are concerned with here – the difficulties inherent in interpreting
null findings from trials of ABI.
COMMONMISUNDERSTANDINGS OF NULL FINDINGS: THE
SIPS PROJECT
As we have seen, despite its apparent shortcomings, NHST con-
tinues to be the preferred framework for investigation in much of
psychology, psychiatry, and other branches of human science, and
is certainly still prevalent in research evaluations of the effective-
ness of ABI. (NHST as taught in textbooks today is a hybrid of the
Fisher and the Neyman–Pearson approaches and no distinctions
between these two approaches will be discussed here.) Opponents
of NHST would no doubt attribute the misunderstandings of null
findings that we will shortly consider to basic flaws in the logic of
NHST (17, 18).
To illustrate these misunderstandings, we will focus on the so-
called Screening and Intervention Program for Sensible drinking
(SIPS) project in England. Other research on ABI could have been
chosen for this purpose but SIPS is a recent and prominent eval-
uation, with potentially important implications for policy and
practice and from which all the necessary points may be made. The
project was funded by the UK Department of Health in 2006 fol-
lowing the publication of the Government’s Alcohol Harm Reduc-
tion Strategy for England (AHRSE) (19). In a section on Screening
and Brief Interventions, the strategy said: “. . . the research evi-
dence on brief interventions draws heavily on small-scale studies
carried out outside the UK. More information is needed on the
most effective methods of targeted screening and brief interven-
tions, and whether the successes shown in research studies can be
replicated within the health system in England. . .. The Depart-
ment of Health will set up a number of pilot schemes by Q1/2005
to test how best to use a variety of models of targeted screening and
brief intervention in primary and secondary healthcare settings,
focusing particularly on value for money and mainstreaming”
[(19), p. 43]. This led eventually to the funding of SIPS which
consisted of a pragmatic, cluster-randomized controlled trial in
each of three settings: PHC, accident and emergency services, and
the criminal justice system. At the time of writing, only the results
for the PHC trial have been published (20) and the other two trials
will not be covered here. As was clear in the Government’s remit
for this research stated above, the trials looked at issues to do with
optimal forms of screening as well as effects of different modes of
ABI but only the latter is of interest here.
The trial had a“step-up”design involving three groups in which
components were successively added: (i) a control group consist-
ing of the provision of a Patient Information Leaflet (PIL) together
with the brief feedback of assessment results (i.e., whether or not
the patient was drinking at a hazardous/harmful level); (ii) a brief
advice (BA) group consisting of 5 min of structured advice about
drinking plus the PIL; (iii) a brief counseling group (BLC) con-
sisting of 20 min of counseling preceded by BA and followed by
the PIL, and given to those patients who returned for a subsequent
consultation. Across three areas of England, GPs and nurses from
24 practices that had not already implemented ABI were recruited
and general practices were randomly allocated to one of the three
conditions described above. Practices were incentivized to partic-
ipate by payments amounting to £3,000 on successful completion
of stages in the project. All primary care staff taking part in the trial
were trained to deliver alcohol screening and brief intervention
according to the trial protocol. Patients aged 18 or over routinely
presenting in primary care and who screened positive on one of
the screening instruments used in the trial were eligible for entry
and a total of 756 were included. Analysis of outcomes at 6 and
12 months following intervention was by intention to treat which
included all patients randomized to study groups whether or not
they had been successfully followed up. Follow-up rates were 83%
at 6 months and 79% at 12 months. Further details of the trial
will be found in the protocol paper (21) and the main outcome
paper (20).
With respect to interventions, the main hypothesis was that
more intensive intervention would result in greater reduction in
hazardous or harmful drinking, thus BLC>BA>PIL. In this con-
text, and recalling the step-up design, the BA condition served as
a control for the specific effects of BLC, the PIL condition served
as a control for the specific effects of BA, and the PIL condition
served as a control for the combined effects of BA and BLC). In
the event, there were no significant differences between groups on
the main outcome measure of the proportion of patients in each
group who obtained a negative score on the Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test [AUDIT, Ref. (22)]. This is shown by Figure 2,
which gives these proportions at baseline, 6- and 12-month follow-
up. Neither were there significant differences between groups on
any other alcohol outcome measure [i.e., mean AUDIT score or
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion of patients scoring <8 (negative status) on the
alcohol use disorders identification test, representing non-hazardous
or non-harmful drinking. Reproduced from Kaner et al. [(19), p. 14].
extent of alcohol problems (23)]. A per-protocol analysis, which
included only those patients who received a complete interven-
tion and were successfully followed up, also failed to show any
significant differences between groups.
The SIPS PHC trial was thus a well-designed and efficiently
conducted investigation of the effects of two forms of brief inter-
vention in real-world settings with adequate statistical power to
detect an effect of brief intervention if one existed. The null find-
ings were no doubt disappointing to the SIPS investigators and
to many in the ABI field. But how should these null findings be
interpreted or, of equal or possibly greater importance, how should
they not be interpreted? We will now consider a number of ways in
which the findings of the SIPS PHC trial have been misunderstood.
(i) The findings show that the three “interventions” under study
are of equal effectiveness in reducing hazardous or harmful
drinking.
This interpretation makes the classic error of “proving the null
hypothesis” (24). The logic of NHST is based on the assumption
that the null hypothesis is true. (The null hypothesis can be any
specified difference between population parameters against which
the research hypothesis is tested but in practice is almost always
taken to be the “nil hypothesis” that the samples come from pop-
ulations with identical parameters, e.g., that there is no difference
between their means.) In a comparison of an experimental ver-
sus a control procedure, the NHST method gives the conditional
probability of the occurrence of an experimental effect equal to
or greater than that observed given that the null hypothesis is true.
If that probability is sufficiently small at a preselected level, con-
ventionally 0.05 or smaller, the null hypothesis is rejected and
the alternative hypothesis that the samples come from different
populations is accepted. However, NHST gives us no information
whatever about the conditional probability of the null hypothesis
being true given the observed data and to imagine that it does is one
of the most common errors in the interpretation of the results of
statistical tests [(17), Chapter 3]. If the probability of the observed
difference is greater than the pre-set level for significance, all one
can conclude is that one has failed to reject the null hypothesis, not
that the null hypothesis has been proved or in any way supported.
Put simply, it is not possible to prove something that has already
been assumed. Note, however, that it is also fallacious to believe
that the null hypothesis can eventually be “proved” by increasing
the sample size and statistical power (25). Thus, with regard to the
SIPS null findings, all that they should be interpreted as showing
is that there is no evidence from this trial that the brief interven-
tions under study are superior in effectiveness to their respective
controls – “absence of evidence,” not “evidence of absence.”
In more practical terms, in addition to sampling variability and
lack of statistical power, there may be many reasons for the failure
to observe a statistically significant difference between experimen-
tal and control group means. It could be, for example, that the
interventions, although shown to be efficacious in randomized
controlled trials conducted in ideal research conditions, are not
effective in more real-world conditions of routine practice (26)
because they have not been faithfully implemented by the prac-
titioners taking part in the trial (27) or because of some other
difference between real-world conditions and the ideal research
conditions in which efficacy was demonstrated.
One particular version of the “proving the null hypothesis”
error focuses on the control condition in the SIPS trial and con-
cludes that, since the PIL and assessment feedback making up that
condition has been shown to be no less effective that the two suc-
cessively more intensive brief interventions, this shows that the
provision of an information leaflet combined with feedback of
assessment results can substitute in practice for ABI. Indeed, this
approach has been called “BI lite” (28). This issue will be returned
to below.
Given that the fallacy of “proving the null hypothesis” is taught
at an elementary level in courses on research methodology and
statistics all over the world, it may be found surprising that such
an error is frequently made in relation to the SIPS PHC findings.
However, the present author can attest that this error is commonly
encountered in commentaries on the SIPS findings in publications
of various kinds, in papers given and conversations overheard at
scientific conferences and other meetings, and in grant propos-
als seeking funding to pursue in some way the implications of
the misinterpreted SIPS findings. Just one example comes from
Pulse, a magazine for health professionals and which claims to
be “at the heart of general practice since 1960” (29). This arti-
cle is headed, “Patient leaflet enough to tackle problem drinking,
researchers suggest” and begins “GPs should give patients with
problem drinking a leaflet rather than advise them to reduce their
alcohol intake.” This is because: “the SIPS study found informing
patients of their drinking levels and offering a leaflet – handed to
patients by a practice nurse – was just as effective as giving patient
5- or 10-min of lifestyle counseling.”
A possible contribution to this level of misunderstanding may
be the fact that in some publications, the SIPS investigators
described the trials as a comparison of the effects of “three inter-
vention conditions” [e.g., Ref. (21)]. This may have led readers to
view the before–after changes in consumption shown by control
group patients as of interest in their own right and as a finding
forming part of the evidence base relevant to the effects of ABI.
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What these changes mean will be discussed in the next section of
this article but what can be said now is that the changes in the
control group cannot be considered to be a “finding” about the
effects of what was included in the control condition. At the risk
of stating the obvious, any conclusion about these effects would
have to be based on a comparison with a further non-intervention,
assessment-only control group that did not include the PIL and/or
assessment feedback, whichever of the two ingredients or their
combination was thought to be of more interest. This was clearly
recognized in the SIPS PHC outcome paper [(20), p. 5]. In view
of the extensive evidence supporting ABI in general, the control
condition used in the SIPS trials was the only kind likely to be
found ethically acceptable. However, although the composition of
the control group was perfectly defensible, to call it an interven-
tion may have misled some consumers of the trial results and it
would have been better to describe the trial in conventional terms
as having two interventions that were evaluated in comparison to
a control condition.
(ii) The PIL plus assessment feedback has been shown to be
more cost–effective than BA and brief counseling and should
therefore be implemented in practice.
This common misinterpretation is clearly related to the previ-
ous one but has more direct and very misleading implications for
practice. It is certainly true that the provision of a leaflet together
with information about assessment results would be cheaper to
implement than either of the two forms of ABI because it would
take less time and would require much less training to deliver.
However, the conclusion that it would be less costly, even statisti-
cally significantly so, is all that can be claimed and, indeed, all that
was claimed by the SIPS investigators (20). The underlying mis-
take is to infer that, because the three “interventions” were equally
effective, then the less costly one must be more cost–effective but,
as we have seen, it cannot be concluded that the ABI and control
conditions were equally effective. And something cannot be called
cost–effective if there is no evidence that it is effective in the first
place.
(iii) The reductions in consumption shown in all three groups
were caused by the “interventions” participants had received.
Again, this misunderstanding is closely related to the two pre-
viously described. The phenomenon in question will be explored
in detail in the following section. Here though it can be noted
that, by the logic of experimental research, in order to make a
causal inference of this kind it is necessary to show that reductions
in drinking shown in the ABI groups were statistically significant
larger than those shown in their appropriate controls and this was
obviously not the case. With regard to the control group reduc-
tions, as noted above, there was no appropriate further control
for the effects of the ingredients of the SIPS control group, so no
causal inferences of any kind may be made. Thus, there was no
evidence from the SIPS PHC trial that any of the conditions under
study led to changes in participants’ drinking.
It should be stressed that the importance of these misunder-
standings is not limited to academic debates between scientists in
learned journals; they could well affect the future provision of ABI
in England and perhaps in other countries. It is well known that
there have been considerable difficulties in persuading GPs, nurses,
and other healthcare professionals to implement ABI routinely in
their practices; there is a copious literature on this problem (30)
and how it may be redressed (31). In surveys of health profession-
als’ attitudes to this work, one of the most commonly encountered
obstacles is “lack of time” or “too busy” (32, 33). There has also
been resistance in England to the inclusion of ABI in the NHS
Quality and Outcomes Framework, under which general practices
are reimbursed for preventive activity. This has created consid-
erable pressure on the relevant sections of the Department of
Health in London (and now its replacement body for this area
of work, Public Health England) to make the interventions that
health professionals are being encouraged to implement as short
and easy to deliver as possible. So too, given the multitude of
demands on their time from a large number of health bodies,
it would be expected that many GPs would call for ABI to be
whittled down to more manageable forms. In times of austerity,
the appeal of shorter, simpler, and less expensive interventions
for widespread implementation in practice must be seductive to
policy-makers.
It is little wonder then that the misunderstandings of the SIPS
findings listed above have been used to recommend the provision
in practice of a PIL as a substitute for ABI, as in the Pulse article
mentioned above. At the risk of repetition, it is not being argued
here that this minimal kind of intervention would necessarily be
ineffective, merely that there is no good evidence at present that
it would be effective. If it is ineffective, or substantially less effec-
tive than ABI proper, and even if GPs and practice nurses definitely
prefer it, its roll-out would represent a waste of precious resources.
And before its ineffectiveness is clearly demonstrated, it might also
derail the effort to achieve the full implementation of ABI proper
that is necessary for widespread clinical benefit and put back the
prospect for achieving this implementation by many years.
It might be conceded that the offer of a PIL following an assess-
ment of alcohol-related risk and harm and the feedback of the
results of that assessment could be defended on purely pragmatic
a priori grounds. Given that resources to implement ABI proper
are scarce and that most GPs and nurses are unwilling to imple-
ment anything more intensive, given too the principle that it is
unlikely to do harm and may even do some good – perhaps start-
ing a process of contemplating the need for change that might
eventually lead to action to cut down drinking (34) – this could
amount to a justification for implementing this minimal inter-
vention (28). The claim would be that it must surely be better
than nothing. But however it is justified, it should not be by a
fallacious inference from the findings of the PHC arm of the SIPS
trial.
WHY DO CONTROL GROUPS IN TRIALS OF ALCOHOL BRIEF
INTERVENTION SHOW REDUCTIONS IN MEAN
CONSUMPTION?
Control groups in trials of ABI frequently show reductions in mean
alcohol consumption from baseline to follow-up and this was cer-
tainly the case in the SIPS PHC trial (see Figure 2). In a review
of such trials, it was calculated that control group participants
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reduce their drinking by approximately 20% (35, 36). A reduction
in drinking of this size is larger than overall differences between
experimental and control groups at follow-up (2) and it is a rea-
sonable assumption that reductions in control groups of this order
may prevent the true effects of ABI from being observed (37). We
also saw that the reductions in consumption shown by control
group participants in the SIPS trial (or, rather, the increase in the
proportion of participants not showing hazardous/harmful drink-
ing – see Figure 2) has been wrongly assumed to have been caused
by the control group procedures, i.e., the provision of a PIL and/or
the feedback of assessment results. To clarify further why it is a
mistake to make this inference, we will now consider other possi-
ble reasons for reductions in control group consumption. In recent
times, our understanding of these reasons had been greatly assisted
by the work of Dr. Jim McCambridge of the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and his various colleagues.
REGRESSION TO THE MEAN
This must be one of the most misunderstood concepts in health
care science (38). It is often thought that because, for example,
participants in a trial of an alcohol intervention are recruited at a
particularly high point in their alcohol consumption, they make
a decision to try to cut down drinking, which is reflected in their
lower consumption at follow-up. This is incorrect; regression to
the mean is a purely statistical phenomenon with no reference
whatever to decisions by trial participants or any other causal
factor impinging on the outcome variable of interest.
Regression to the mean can be thought of as the obverse of
correlation (39). If any two randomly distributed properties of
individuals are less than perfectly correlated in a population, then
it must be the case that extreme scorers on one of the variables will
tend to show less extreme scores on the other. This applies in both
directions; high scorers on the first variable will tend to show lower
scores on the second and low scorers on the first will tend to show
higher scores on the second. The smaller the correlation between
the two variables, the greater will be the tendency for those with
more extreme scores on one variable to approach the mean in their
scores on the other. In the example in which we are interested, the
two variables in question are the same participants’ scores on the
AUDIT questionnaire (22) at entry to the trial and at follow-up.
In this case, however, participants will have been selected for entry
to the trial on the basis of their relatively high scores (i.e., above
the recognized cut-point for hazardous/harmful drinking) on the
AUDIT. As a consequence, it is inevitably true that participants’
scores at follow-up will tend to be lower than at intake due only to
the nature of random fluctuation and statistical correlation. The
same applies to any variable used for trial selection that is corre-
lated, but less than perfectly so, with a variable used to evaluate
outcome at follow-up.
The possible effects of regression to the mean on control group
participants in brief intervention trials were studied empirically
by McCambridge and colleagues (40). These authors gave the
AUDIT to a large cohort of university students in New Zealand
at baseline and 6 months later, without any attempt to intervene
in their drinking. Selecting from this cohort for analysis those
individuals with a baseline AUDIT score of 8+, the usual cut-
point for entry to trials of ABI, the observed mean reduction over
time was approximately half that obtained in the full sample with-
out selection. When selection was made using a series of higher
AUDIT thresholds, the observed reductions in mean alcohol con-
sumption were successively larger. This evidence suggests that a
substantial part of the reduction in consumption shown by con-
trol groups can be explained by the statistical artifact of regression
to the mean.
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION EFFECTS
This is an umbrella term referring to a range of ways in which
merely taking part in a research study can influence participants’
behavior, quite apart from any effects on behavior the researchers
may intend (41). An older term for these influences is “Hawthorne
effects,” referring to a famous series of studies from 1924 to 1933
at the Hawthorne Works of Western Electric outside Chicago. The
results of these studies were interpreted as showing that the pro-
ductivity of workers increased just through their awareness of
having their behavior monitored as part of a research project,
although other explanations are possible (42). In a systematic
review of the literature relevant to the Hawthorne effect (43), it
was concluded that the effect certainly existed but that little could
be confidently known about it, including how large it was, without
more research.
The wider term “research participation effects” refers to a range
of phenomena that might introduce bias in estimates of behavior
change in randomized controlled trials. These include the effects
of signing an informed consent form and of reactions to ran-
domization – for example, disappointment or resentment at being
allocated to the control rather than the intervention condition. The
possible effects on behavior of being screened or assessed prior
to randomization will be considered below. Another important
class of research participation effects is known by psychologists as
“demand characteristics” (44). This refers to expectations partici-
pants may have about what the researcher is interested in studying
and possible attempts by them to conform, or not, to what they
think the researcher is trying to demonstrate. This source of bias
is mainly relevant to laboratory research but McCambridge and
colleagues have reviewed evidence of its possible influence on
participant behavior in non-laboratory settings (45). An obvious
example here is a tendency by a participant at research follow-up
to underestimate their alcohol consumption because they surmise
that the project is trying to reduce this outcome and they wish to
please the follow-up interviewer; alternatively, they might exagger-
ate their consumption in a deliberate attempt to undermine what
they guess is the purpose of the project. Influences of this sort
could apply both to control and intervention group participants
and represent one kind of problem with the validity of self-reports
of behavior in research trials.
HISTORICAL TRENDS
An obvious way in which the alcohol-related behavior of control
group participants might be influenced is by changes over time in
the per capita consumption of alcohol in the geographical area in
which the research is taking place. Average consumption at follow-
up compared with trial entry could be reduced due to the increased
price of alcoholic beverages, through higher taxation or in other
ways, which is known to be strongly related to consumption levels
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(46). Changes in the density of alcohol retail outlets, community
attitudes to drunkenness, stricter enforcement of drink-driving
legislation and a large number of other variables that can affect
the level of alcohol consumption in a population (47) could also
contribute to these reductions.
ASSESSMENT REACTIVITY
This last category of possible explanations for control group reduc-
tions in consumption has been the one to which most attention
has been devoted in the literature on ABI. The idea here is that
simply requiring a research participant formally to answer ques-
tions about their drinking can affect the drinking itself (48). This
might be by directing participants’ attention to their drinking and
raising the possibility in their minds that it might be hazardous or
harmful, thus leading to attempts to cut down, or in some other
unknown way. The literature has focused on the effects of research
assessment conducted after informed consent has been obtained,
which can sometime take longer to complete than the ABI itself
(49), but the effects of screening carried out prior to informed
consent and entry to the trial have also been examined (50). Possi-
ble screening effects will be included under “assessment reactivity”
in the remainder of this discussion.
McCambridge and Kypri (51) conducted a systematic review
and meta-analysis of studies in the field of ABI that had attempted
to answer the question of whether and by how much research
assessments influence behavior by using randomized experimen-
tal methods. Ten studies were identified, of which eight provided
findings for quantitative analysis. The general conclusion of this
review was that research assessment did alter subsequent self-
reported behavior in relation to alcohol consumption but that
the effect was small, equivalent to 13.7 g of ethanol per week (one
US standard drink or 11/2 UK units). On the other hand, as the
authors point out, although small, this effect amounted to about
35% of the most recent and reliable estimate of the effect of ABI
itself (2).
Of the eight studies included in the meta-analysis (51), five took
place in university student populations and might be considered
less than fully relevant to the matter at hand here. The three studies
that took place in health care settings included two in emergency
departments (52, 53) and one in PHC (54). None of these studies
reported significant effects of assessment (or, indeed, of ABI). It is
obvious that we need more studies of this kind to arrive at reliable
estimates of the effects of assessment on subsequent drinking but
at present it appears that such effects are smaller in health care
than in university student settings.
McCambridge and colleagues subsequently conducted a study
in Sweden (the AMADEUS Project) (55) to evaluate the effects of
online assessment and feedback of results from the AUDIT-C (56).
University students were randomized to groups consisting of (i)
assessment and feedback; (ii) assessment-only without feedback;
and (iii) neither assessment nor feedback. Findings were that stu-
dents in group (i) had significantly fewer risky drinkers at 3-month
follow-up than those in group (iii), while students in group (ii)
scored lower on the AUDIT-C at follow-up that those in group
(iii). This study thus provided some evidence for the effects of
assessment and feedback on drinking behavior but findings were
short-term and inconsistent, and the effects themselves small.
To return to a consideration of the SIPS primary care findings,
it is sometimes suggested that a mere assessment of someone’s
drinking can serve as well as an ABI or, at least, will result in
a reduction in alcohol consumption that would be valuable in
busy health care settings with little time to do much else. The
notion that research assessments could be the ABIs of the future
has received serious attention (57). There are several points to
make here. First, we have just seen that the evidence to support
this suggestion is very thin; more research may reveal a different
picture but, at present, there is insufficient evidence to conclude
that assessments, at least of the kind normally used in research,
can substitute for ABI as it has traditionally been conceived in
health care settings. Secondly, although they may have the effect
of inducing behavioral change by drawing attention to drinking,
questions making up conventional research assessment are not
designed explicitly to promote such change, e.g., by deliberately
seeking to foster a discrepancy between the person’s actual self-
concept in relation to drinking behavior and the drinking of their
ideal self, by asking explicitly about intentions to cut down or quit,
or by enquiring about the perceived benefits of more moderate
drinking (51, 58). Thus, future research might evaluate the effects
of assessments of alcohol-related behavior deliberately designed to
encourage changes in drinking. Thirdly, an appropriate research
design for the investigation of the effects of assessment reactivity
would be a non-inferiority trial (59) in which an assessment-only
condition is compared to an ABI with the hypothesis that it is not
inferior in its effects on drinking at follow-up. Using the methodol-
ogy and recommended analysis for a non-inferiority trial, it would
be possible to show that two types of intervention do not differ in
effectiveness.
Lastly, the suggestion that assessments might serve to reduce
drinking says nothing about the possible effects of feeding back
assessment results or of providing a PIL. If it is true that assess-
ments are effective in themselves, the contents of the control
condition in the SIPS trial might be entirely redundant and need
not be part of an effective intervention. On the other hand, it
is reasonable to think that assessment feedback would make an
additional contribution to change and that giving the patient infor-
mation to take away that could be consulted if the motivation to
change increases might also be an effective ingredient of inter-
vention. In the first case, assessment feedback forms an essential
part of a type of intervention known in different circumstances to
be effective (60), albeit over two sessions, and is also integral to
Motivational Enhancement Therapy (61), albeit over three or four
sessions. In relation to the provision of a PIL, and depending on
how much information of what kind it contained, bibliotherapy
in general has been shown to be an effective means of decreasing
alcohol problems (62). The truth, however, is that we do not know
if assessments, assessment feedback or PILs are effective in them-
selves or in combination, and it is to these questions that research
should be directed.
It will not have escaped the reader’s attention that all four pos-
sible explanations above for reductions in alcohol consumption in
control groups in trials of ABI apply equally well to reductions in
intervention groups in those trials. It is precisely for that reason
that, if we wish to make real progress in implementing effective
ABIs in routine practice, we cannot avoid relying on randomized
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trials in which these factors are controlled across intervention and
control groups, leaving the only difference between groups the
intervention component under test. However, plausible current
inferences from the literature may seem in which a case is made
for the widespread introduction of assessment feedback and PIL
as a substitute for ABI proper, there is no way such a policy can
pretend to be evidence-based. If they believe at all in evidence-
based practice, those who favor the implementation of screening
followed by simple feedback and written information must be
able to show that such a procedure is superior in effectiveness to
appropriate control conditions in well-designed and sufficiently
powered pragmatic randomized controlled trials. To implement
this procedure without such evidence risks wasting hard-fought
gains of 30 years research on ABI.
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND
EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE
We saw above that, under the conventional NHST approach to
statistical inference from RCTs, when no significant differences on
outcome measures between intervention and control groups have
been found, we are unable to distinguish between two conceivable
interpretations of these null findings: (i) there is no evidence that
the means of the two groups differ and nothing can be said about
the effectiveness of intervention one way or the other, and (ii) there
is evidence that the means do not differ, that the null hypothesis
is true and that the intervention is therefore ineffective. These two
interpretations have been shortened here to (i) absence of evi-
dence and (ii) evidence of absence. This dilemma can be applied,
of course, to more than one experimental group in comparison to
a control group, as in the SIPS PHC findings discussed above. It
is this dilemma, so this article has argued, that has held back, and
continues to hold back, progress in a scientific understanding and
beneficial application of ABI.
There are two sets of unfortunate possible consequences of
this lack of information. First, in the situation where absence of
evidence is properly concluded from non-significant findings but
there is actually no difference between means in the population,
time and resources may be wasted on continuing to search for
an effect of intervention when none in fact exists. On the other
hand, if it is improperly concluded under the NHST approach
that there is evidence of an absence of difference between means
when there is in fact a real potential effect of intervention in the
population, then an opportunity to implement, or at least to sup-
port the implementation of, an effective intervention will have
been missed. Both these kinds of negative consequence may have
interfered with progress on particular forms of ABI in the past.
More important from the present perspective, they are likely to
retard research on the effects of ABI in the many novel popula-
tions of hazardous and harmful drinkers in which it is desired to
implement ABI and the novel settings in which these drinkers may
be found.
There is, however, a solution to this problem but it means aban-
doning the NHST handling of null findings in favor of an approach
from Bayesian statistics. The Bayesian approach to the problem
of interpreting null findings has been developed recently by Dr.
Zoltán Dienes of the University of Susses (63) and this section
will rely heavily on his work. This is not the place to attempt a
complete description of Bayesian statistics but good introductions
are available (64, 65), including one by Dienes (66) comparing
the Bayesian approach to statistical inference by the orthodox
approach.
Suffice it to say here that Bayesian statistics is founded on a com-
pletely different philosophical understanding of probability from
conventional NHST statistics. Bayesian statistics defines proba-
bility subjectively, as a measure of the degree of confidence one
has that some event will occur or that some particular hypoth-
esis is true. The conventional, Neyman–Pearson approach on
which NHST is based defines probability objectively, in terms of
long-run relative frequencies of the occurrence of events. From
this fundamental difference in the understanding of probability
all other differences flow. The mantra of Bayesian statistics is:
“the posterior is proportional to the likelihood times the prior.”
Working backwards, the “prior” is the subjective probability that
a hypothesis is true before collecting data; the “likelihood” is
the probability of obtaining the observed data given that the
prior hypothesis is true; the “posterior” is the probability of the
hypothesis being true given the observed data and is calculated
by multiplying the likelihood by the prior. From the Bayesian
perspective, scientific progress consists of updating the proba-
bility of hypotheses being true in the light of observed data
(66).
While under NHST only two conclusions are possible from the
results of an experiment, either the null hypothesis is rejected or
it is not, from a Bayesian perspective there are three: (i) there is
strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis; (ii) there is strong
evidence for the null hypothesis; (iii) the data are insensitive with
respect to the alternative and null hypotheses. To determine which
of these conclusions applies to any given sets of results, it is neces-
sary to calculate something called the Bayes Factor (B). This is the
ratio of the likelihood of the observed data given the alternative
hypothesis over the likelihood of the data given the null hypoth-
esis. If this ratio is >1, the alternative hypothesis is supported;
if it is <1, the null hypothesis is supported; and if it is about 1
the experiment is insensitive and neither hypothesis is supported.
To arrive a firm decision in practice, recommended cut-offs (67)
are that B >3 represents substantial evidence for the alternative
hypothesis and B less that 1/3 represents substantial evidence for
the null hypothesis, with values in between representing a range
of weak evidence for either hypothesis depending on whether B is
greater or less than 1.
One immediate advantage of the Bayesian method is that the
researcher is forced to stipulate an alternative hypothesis in terms
of the size of the effect that, say, an intervention is expected to show
relative to a control condition and its minimum and maximum
values. While the stipulation of the alternative hypothesis is often
said to be desirable under NHST, it is rarely done. In practice, the
Bayesian researcher specifies a range of population values for the
parameter of interest, say the difference between intervention and
control group means, with prior probabilities for each population
value and the way in which these probabilities are distributed over
the range of population values [(66), Chapter 4]. This procedure
facilitates good science.
It will have been noted that, although the Bayesian approach
allows the null hypothesis to be accepted, there is still an
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intermediate range of values of B, conventionally between 1/3
and 3, where the evidence is weak and which can therefore be
considered a reappearance of the absence of evidence conclusion.
However, the striking difference between Bayes and NHST in this
situation is that, in the former, the researcher can quite legitimately
continue to collect data until one of the two boundary conditions,
either 3 or 1/3, is reached; this is the only “stopping rule” that
applies to data collection under Bayes. By contrast, under NHST
the collection of further data beyond the sample size given by the
power calculation and stipulated before the experiment began is
methodologically spurious and, if not openly declared, unethical.
Of course, owing to the finite nature of research funding, fixed
research plans and other practical matters, it will often be impos-
sible to collect more data but the opportunity remains available in
principle under the Bayesian method. And it is important to repeat
that, even if further data collection is not possible, the information
deriving from the Bayesian approach is still superior to that from
NHST in allowing the distinction to be made between evidence of
absence and absence of evidence.
In more general terms, the battle for dominance between
Bayesian and Fisher/Neyman–Pearson statistical inference has
been waged for many years between camps of statisticians, philoso-
phers, and those researchers who take an interest in the funda-
mentals of their scientific disciplines (68). Those who favor Bayes,
and have described its varied advantages over conventional sta-
tistics, have found that change in scientific practice, especially in
the human sciences, is slow to occur. Journal editors, for example,
may be loath to accept papers based on Bayesian statistics and,
in any event, Bayesian and conventional analyses will often agree
in their conclusions. As Dienes (63) points out, however, one way
in which they do clearly disagree is in the interpretation of non-
significant results. The solution here is to use mainly orthodox
statistics but, whenever a non-significant result is found, to calcu-
late a Bayes factor in the interest of disambiguation. This seems an
eminently sensible solution to the problem of null findings which,
as has been argued in the article, holds back progress in the field
of ABI research. A program for calculating Bayes Factors can be
accessed at http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/
inference/Bayes.htm.
If this solution were adopted, when we observed a non-
significant result from an RCT, it would be possible to conclude
that the specific form of ABI being evaluated was ineffective and
not worth pursuing further, so that precious resources would not
be wasted. On the other hand, we could conclude that it was
unclear whether the ABI in question was effective or not and that
further research was needed. The difference from the conclusion
based on the conventional perspective, however, is that we would
already have ruled out the possibility that the intervention was
ineffective. [It is also possible that the Bayes Factor could provide
evidence for the alternative hypothesis and allow the conclusion
that the intervention was effective when the conventional NHST
approach had not been able to reject the null hypothesis (63).]
This method could be applied to the non-significant results of
trials such as SIPS to reduce uncertainly about and possible mis-
understanding of their results. The results of an analysis of SIPS
data using the Bayesian approach to null findings will form the
basis of a further communication.
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